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Introduction
In recent years, a signi…cant literature on monetary theory has emerged to study how money arises endogenously. One such strand of the literature has used search-theoretic models of monetary exchange to understand the role of fundamental frictions such as spatial, temporal or information frictions, lack of commitment and lack of recordkeeping that make money essential. For example, see Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) , Trejos and Wright (1995) and Shi (1995) for the pioneers of this literature. However, a challenge in the literature is to keep track of the endogenous distribution of money, which makes policy analysis di¢ cult without restricting the divisibility of money and goods, or relying on sophisticated computation methods, see Molico (2006) . 1 It was not until the seminal work by Lagos and Wright (2005, hereby LW) that researchers can work with an environment which allows divisible money and divisible goods, but at the same time keeps the distribution of money balance degenerate. The key trick in LW is to assume quasi-linear preferences. 2 However, quasi-linear utility is incompatible with many useful utility functions, for example, the one with constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. In other words, one might worry that modern monetary theories based on LW are not compatible with many other macroeconomic theories based on general preferences, and of limited application. Furthermore, in LW there is no wealth e¤ect on consumption -any wealth e¤ect only re ‡ects on change in labor supply. Also, since utility must be separable in LW, there is no substitution nor complementary e¤ect between consumption and labor through the preferences channel. Such features cast some doubt on the robustness of the result derived, if other preferences are used instead.
This paper shows that quasi-linear utility is su¢ cient but not necessary for tractability. In particular, this paper identi…es a broad class of preferences which features a degenerate money distribution in equilibrium. 
The Model
Consider the similar environment as in the LW model. Time is discrete and in…nite, indexed by t = 0; 1::: There is a [0; 1] continuum of agents who live forever with discount factor 2 (0; 1). In each period, two markets, DM and CM, convene subsequently. Trading in the DM is decentralized and bilateral (agents are paired with probability ). 3 Some agents (sellers) can produce a divisible and perishable goods but do not want to consume, while others (buyers) want to consume but cannot produce, hence trading emerges. Agents can only observe the actions and outcomes of their trades, and are anonymous. 4 There is no commitment nor enforcement.
Trading in the CM is centralized. All agents receive government money transfer, work, consume, rebalance their money at some market-clearing prices. Money is divisible, intrinsically worthless and non-perishable, with initial supply M 0 for each agents and subsequent supply controlled by the government. This setting is useful to capture the endogenous rise of money as the medium of exchange.
Instead of assuming quasi-linear preferences as in LW, we formulate the instantaneous utility by the following general utility function:
where X and H (x and h) are consumption and labor during the CM (DM). We maintain the following standard assumptions that the economy is "smooth", and there exists some trade in the DM with positive total surplus (otherwise no trade in the DM is preferable):
Assumption 1 Assume u and U are C n with n 2. Also, assume U X > 0; U H < 0; U XX < 0, U HH 0, u x > 0; u h < 0; u xx < 0, u hh 0 and u (U ) satis…es Inada condition in x (X). Also, assume u (0; 0) = 0, and max q fu (q; 0) + u (0; q)g > 0.
I begin by describing the value functions, taking as given the terms of trade and the distribution of money. In general, the state variable relevant for an agent in the DM is a vector of aggregate states S t ( t ; w t ; G t ( t m t )), where t is the value of money in the centralized market, w t the wage of labor, and G t the cumulative distribution function of the real money balances t m t held by agents in the DM.
The agent takes as given a law of motion S t+1 = (S t ), but it will be determined endogenously in equilibrium.
In the DM, with probability 1=2, the agent matches a seller and consumes
x goods with utility u (x; 0). By symmetry, there is probability that the agent matches a buyer and producers h goods with disutility u (0; h). In a match in the DM, since the seller's production h must equal the buyer's consumption x, their common value is denoted by q t (z; z 0 ; S t ), and the real money balances that change hands by d t (z; z 0 ; S t ), where in general these depend on the real money holdings of the buyer z and of the seller z 0 as well as the aggregate state S t . Unless potential confusion arises, I suppress the dependence on S t . At the beginning of DM, given his real money balances z, the agent's value function V t is the Bellman equation solving
At the beginning of CM, the agent i's value function W t is the Bellman equation
where t+1 t = t+1 1 is the in ‡ation rate, T t the real government transfer, z i t+1
the real money balances carried into the DM in t + 1, and t the dividends from …rms. Now, for the illustration purpose, consider the generalized Nash bargaining for matches in the DM, which is commonly used in the literature. For a buyer with the real money balances z who matches the seller with the real money balances z 0 in the
where the buyer's bargaining power is given by 2 (0; 1].
During the CM, the …rm has access to a general production technology X = F (H) 4 and hires agents at wage w t . 5 The …rm maximizes pro…t t :
where
t di is the aggregate labor supply of agents. We maintain the following assumption to ensure Pareto optimum allocation in a centralized market exists and unique, and the Pareto optimum allocation is su¢ cient large to support some monetary trades in the DM:
Assumption 2 There exists unique X 2 (0; 1) and H 2 (0; 1) that maximize
Assume z u (q ; 0) = .
The government injects money T t = t = M t+1 M t as lump sum transfer in the CM.
Let M t+1 =M t 1 denote the growth rate of money supply. In the equilibrium, money demand equals to the money supply, ie
, and the government budget becomes:
which is assumed always satis…ed.
Also, for later use, de…ne a function Z (q) as
Here Z (q) will be shown to be the payment to the seller for q goods, adjusting for the bargaining power. The seller extracts all the trade surplus when = 0 and hence Z (q) = u (0; q); zero trade surplus when = 1 and Z (q) = u (0; q). De…ne the …rst best production q in the DM as the solution to u x (q ; 0) + u h (q ; 0) = 0, and the …rst best real payment as Z Z (q ). It is straightforward to show that Z (q) is strictly increasing for all q < q , hence Z is invertible. Here, I introduce a technical condition only used occasionally to establish some stronger results: 5 We nest LW as the special case with F (H) = H.
Condition 1 Assume the solution arg max
Condition 1 guarantees that Nash bargaining solution is well-behaved such that it is never the reason to the multiplicity of equilibrium.
Equilibrium
De…ne an (monetary) equilibrium as follows: maximizes (1) and (2) subject to (3) and the bargaining solution (4) 2. (…rm optimization)
To ease the presentation, we …rst introduce a class U of preference and then verify the existence and uniqueness of a degenerate equilibrium for any U 2 U.
De…nition 3 U is the collection of U such that for each U 2 U, for any X 0 and
Obviously, the quasi-linear preferences studied in LW satisfy (8) . Later we will solve the entire class of the exact solution to U. Now, we are ready to summarize an important result by the following proposition Proposition 1 Given the maintained assumptions and 1. Then for any U 2 U, there always exists a degenerate equilibrium. Furthermore, if U XH 0 and condition 1 holds, then the equilibrium is unique. In particular, the degenerate equilibrium is given by z i i;t = Z (q) = , where q solves
and the Nash bargaining solution in the equilibrium is given by
Proposition 1 has the following interpretation. In the equilibrium, ! ux(q;0) Zq(q) 1 is the liquidity premium (also known as bubble) of money. The equilibrium price of money is the nominal interest rate (1 + ) = 1. The marginal return of money is the liquidity premium ! from consumption in the DM.
The major e¤ort of the proof is to construct a degenerate equilibrium allocation which clears the CM goods market under heterogenous agents. The proof illustrates the seven steps to construct such a degenerate equilibrium allocation and verify its uniqueness, with the helps of three additional lemmas. Under general preferences, agents entering CM with higher money holding would choose higher X
, and the goods market clears, i.e.,
In LW it is straightforward since F is linear and X i t is always constant due to the assumption of quasi-linear utility: U X becomes independent to H, and both F H R verify that under Z q (q) > u h (0; q) for all. 7 Then we have
that is the social marginal trade surplus is greater than the social marginal cost of trade with money. Thus there is under-production in this economy. In sum, the e¢ ciency loss comes from the in ‡ation tax and the holdup problem. Implementing the …rst best in the equilibrium requires in ‡ating the economy at the discount rate 
The Complete Solution to U and Examples
In general, the whole class of exact solution to U is given by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If U 2 U, then U has either form:
uxx(q;0)u h (0;q) ux(q;0)u hh (0;q)
where C i , i = 1:::9, are arbitrary constant and ' is arbitrary C m function, m 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
One might worry that U is still a very restrictive class of preferences. Actually several members of U have being commonly studied in other macro literatures, for example, it includes the class of constant return to scale (CRS) preferences. A popular member of CRS is the utility with constant elasticity of substitution (CES), which has the form U (X;
, for all 2 ( 1; 1).
Lucas (1988) 
, where g is some increasing and strictly concave function. Barro and Becker (1989) use the CRS utility U (C; H) = H e U
X H
, where e U is some increasing and strictly concave function, to study endogenous fertility.
The utility class U also includes non CRS functions. A prime example is the quasi-linear utility U (X; H) = e U (X) AH used in LW. Also, U includes the class of non-separable constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) utility U (X; H) = exp ( X X H (1 H)), which is widely used in, for example, asset pricing literature or economy featuring incomplete market since the associated consumption function is tractable even in a stochastic environment.
Monetary Policy and Welfare
Having established the existence and uniqueness of degenerate equilibrium, we are ready to examine the welfare consequence of monetary policy in this economy. De…ne a utilitarian welfare function as
In LW, Friedman rule is optimal: a higher money growth rate always reduces welfare. Is it still true under the joint e¤ects of general preferences and general trading protocol? The following proposition concludes that Friedman rule is still optimal in general:
Proposition 2 Given the maintained assumptions and U 2 U, …x a degenerate equilibrium, then != 0, z= 0 and W= 0.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 2 summarizes the e¤ect of monetary policy in this economy: a higher money growth rate always increases the liquidity premium ! but reduces the equilibrium real money balance z. In the end, proposition 3 concludes that a higher money growth rate reduces the welfare W. It is resulted from an important welfare feature of the utility class U in this economy: the welfare part from CM is always independent to in ‡ation, hence the welfare can be solely ordered by the part from DM. The later is always decreasing in the in ‡ation rate, since in ‡ation is a tax to consumption in the DM and it worsens the holdup problem of holding money for transaction in the DM. Of course, this negative welfare consequence of money growth is not universally true. It is expected to be modi…ed when additional frictions are introduced.
To see the intuition of why the welfare from CM is independent to in ‡ation, notice that under the utility class U, the fact that agents share the same marginal rate of substitution implies that they also share the same marginal utility of consumption and the same marginal disutility of labor. Hence, goods market clearing condition implies that the rise in the seller's utility (due to the wealth e¤ect of receiving money balance from the buyer) exactly cancels the decrease in the buyer's utility, thus equilibrium money balance, hence in ‡ation, has zero net e¤ect on the welfare from CM.
Proposition 2 establishes a strong welfare benchmark: the optimality of Friedman rule is robust under general preferences, thought it does not necessarily implement the …rst best. The potential e¢ ciency loss of Friedman rule comes from decentralized trading with money. The robustness of Friedman rule may or may not fail under additional frictions, which are subject to future studies.
Conclusion
In this paper, I lay out the key assumption which preserves the tractability of a micro- 
Proof of Proposition 1
Before proving proposition, we …rst de…ne homogeneous Monge-Ampere equation and establish the following lemma:
De…nition 4 U satis…es homogeneous Monge-Ampere equation if for any X and H, there exists a function : R ! R, where 2 C n 1 , such that U solves either one of the following partial di¤erential equation:
Lemma 2 U 2 U if and only if U satis…es homogeneous Monge-Ampere equation. If
Proof. To prove the "if" part of the lemma, …x any U satisfying homogeneous MongeAmpere equation. Consider the case of (10). Then di¤erentiate both sides of (10) with respect to X and to H, we have: If U XX 6 = 0 except on a set of zero measure, then U HX =U XX is well-de…ned almost surely. Fix some " > 0. For any U X (X; H), de…ne x (t) and h (t) as function in t such that x (0) = h (0) = ", x (1) = X and h (1) = H. Then we can construct (U X (X; H)) as a path integral of t over [0; 1]:
(U X (X; H))
where the second line utilizes the fact that U XX 6 = 0 and U HH = (U XH ) 2 =U XX for any U 2 U. Thus U always satis…es (10) . Similar construction for the case of U HH 6 = 0 and then we have U always satisfying (11) . Finally, if U XX = 0 or U HH = 0 on a set of positive measure, then we have constant U X or constant U H , hence is a constant function, so either (10) or (11) is satis…ed.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify the "only if" part that U of the form in Lemma 1 implies U satisfying homogeneous Monge-Ampere equation.
Lemma 3 Given the maintained assumptions and U 2 U. Suppose an equilibrium exists. Fix w t , then there exists positive function (w) such that for all z
Also, the value function have the form
Furthermore, if U XH 0, then such (w) exists and is unique even o¤-equilibrium path.
Proof. Given lemma 2, the …rst order conditions w.r.t. X and H of the Bellman equation (2) imply
Since the right hand side only depends on U X (X To show (14), apply an envelope theorem then we have V z;t (z) = U X (X i t ; H i t ) = ' (w t ). Then integrating V z;t (z) over z we have (14) .
To show uniqueness of (w t ), since U H < 0, we have ( ) < 0. Since U XX 0 and U XH 0, then from (12) we have 0 ( ) 0, then the right hand side of the above is strictly decreasing in U X (X i , if z < Z = (w t ) ;
as well as agents budget (3) after substituting (5), (6) and (17): Notice that (18) has made use of (14) from lemma 3.
First, by assumption 2 there is unique X and H such that F H (H ) U X (X ; H ) = U H (X ; H ). Set U X (X ; H ), H t = H and w t = F H (H ). Thus the …rm's …rst order condition (17) is satis…ed.
Second, set U X (X 
To see the existence of such q, consider the two limit cases: q = q and q = 0. i :
So the right hand side of (21) at q = 0 is in…nite. Since 1 and hence the left hand side of (21) is …nite and positive, the fact that the right hand side of (21) is continuous in q implies there exists some q satisfying (21).
Set z t = Z (q) = . Then given lemma 2, the …rst order condition (18) becomes (21), which is automatically satis…ed by construction of z.
Third, it is straight-forward to verify from lemma 1 that for any U 2 U, U X always has the form
if U is of the form in lemma 1.1, or
